ASA’s mission was electronic warfare, substantially communications intelligence (COMINT) and security (COMSEC), much like the National Security Agency (NSA), who had operational control over ASA. The difference is that ASA was officially part of the army, wearing uniforms, saluting officers and such. ASA had its own personnel and supply systems, separate from the rest of the US Army. This was a point of contention for the Army bosses who wanted more control of these ‘renegades’ of the ASA. At the end of 1976 they got their wish. ASA was absorbed by Army Intelligence, and its members found themselves in the real Army.
One might respond, “I get the intelligence part, but security?” The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and VC had their own COMINT operations going on. They listened to our communications to learn whatever they could about our strengths, weaknesses, locations, and plans. They sometimes also practiced ‘imitative communicative deception’ (ICD). Through ICD, the enemy would get into our radio networks and ask for tactical information, provide misdirection, or even call in our artillery on US and allied positions. The COMSEC mission of RRUs was to reduce or prevent the loss of information to the enemy’s listening programs and to instruct in prevention of successful ICD.
ASA’s COMSEC side listened in on US forces’ communications. The COMINT side listened in on the enemy’s communications. Thus, the unofficial ASA motto became, “In God we trust. All others we monitor.”
COMSEC personnel listened in on friendly radio and telephone communications and reported on security weaknesses, recommending solutions to the problems found. Some personnel conducted inspections of COMSEC equipment and its usage. Oftentimes, the units we supported did not truly welcome our input. They most often either underestimated or disbelieved the existence of the NVA/VC COMINT ability and did not see the threat as real. They wanted to assume away the problem in the interest of simplicity and ‘efficiency.’ Unfortunately, it sometimes took a disaster to open their eyes to the true situation. Too many times, lapses in communications security resulted in American deaths.
On Christmas Day,1969, the 1st Infantry Division, while operating in Binh Duong Province near Saigon, stumbled upon a North Vietnamese COMINT unit. They captured 12 of the 18 people in the unit, 2000 documents and the unit’s intercept equipment. The threat was real.
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